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Abstract  
The aim of this paper is to examine whether or not financial liberalization has triggered banking 
crises in developing countries. We focus in particular on the role of capital inflows as their 
volatilities threat economic stability. In the empirical model, based on Panel Logit estimation, we 
use the two common financial liberalization indicators (de facto and dejure) for a panel of 58 
developing countries for the period from 1984 to 2007. Unlike the previous studies, this paper 
reveals that both indicators of financial liberalization did not trigger banking crises in our 
sample.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Financial liberalization is defined as the implementation of a set of measures aimed at 
eliminating the different restrictions and repression on the financial sector of a country that could 
hinder the well-functioning of its economy. According to McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), 
the main source of repression is indubitably the intervention of the government in the monetary 
sphere to set interest rate and to fix the different tools of monetary policy. The authors viewed 
the liberalization -of interest rates and capital account- as an efficient solution to eliminate 
directed credits and to remove control of interest rate and high reserve requirements. They 
consider the external financial liberalization as an important economic policy tool that enhances 
economic growth. McKinnon and Shaw consider financial liberalization as a mainstay of 
economic reforms in developing countries (Balassa, 1989). They called these countries to 
participate to the global financial integration to benefit the advantages of interconnected financial 
systems and to promote their banking and financial sector.  
In the late eighties, financial liberalization became a strategy suggested by the International 
monetary fund under a framework called “Structural Adjustment Programs” (SAPs henceforth) 
to rescue fragile economies, notably those of developing countries (Hamdi et al. 2013). This 
framework suggests the easing of portfolio restrictions on banks, changing in the ownership of 
banks, enhancing competition among banks, integrating of domestic entities to international 
markets, as well as changing in the monetary policy environment (Ucer 1998). As a result, 
numerous countries adopted the SAPs and have progressively liberalized their economies.   
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Literature on financial liberalization is rich and abundant. However, the empirical studies have 
produced mixed and conflicting results on the benefits of financial liberalization on the 
performance of the banking sector and/or economic growth.  In fact, some authors (Levine 2001, 
Prasard et al. 2003, Mishkin 2005) showed that liberalization of capital flows can benefit both 
source and host countries by improving resource allocation, reducing financing costs, increasing 
competition and accelerating the development of domestic financial systems (IMF, 2012). 
Rogoff (1999) showed that liberalization of capital flows enhances the level of free trade in 
financial claims; reduces the misallocation of resources and increases investment. Prasard et al. 
(2003) showed that opening up an economy to capital flows promotes domestic savings, reduces 
the cost of capital, and reduces the consumption volatility.  Mishkin (2005) supports these 
arguments and add that liberalization stimulate the domestic financial sector development, which 
in turn promotes growth.  
On the other hand, several studies showed the adverse impact of liberalization of capital flows 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2000; Mehrez and Kaufmann, 2000). It was argued that 
liberalization is a principal threat to economic stability due to the volatility of capital flows. 
Stiglitz (2002) argued that financial openness leaves emerging market countries vulnerable to 
external crises, which have a severe negative effect on domestic economic performance. 
According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005), the accumulation of larger stocks of gross foreign 
assets and liabilities has increased the magnitude of fluctuations in the value of cross-border 
holdings. 
 
Following the multiple crises of the nineties2, several studies were carried out to examine the 
possible link between financial liberalization and banking crises. For example, Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) showed that among the 26 cases of banking crises they found, 18 of them took 
place after five years from the liberalization of the financial market. Similarly, Kaminsky (2008) 
showed that a high level of financial integration increases the risk of sudden stop of capital 
flows, even in the absence of macroeconomic imbalances found in the host country. In another 
study, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) conducted a study to examine the determinants of banking 
crises for a large sample of countries over the period 1800-2008. They found that, since the early 
                                                          
2
 The South-Asian and Russian crises in 1997-98, Brazil 1999, Ecuador 2000, Turkey 2001, Argentina 2001, and 
Uruguay 2002. 
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19th century, there was a strong correlation between capital mobility and banking crises. The 
same study also showed that during the periods where capital mobility was interrupted3, there 
was a remarkable decrease in banking crises. More recently; Joyce (2010) conducted a study to 
assess the effect of financial integration on the costs and duration of systemic banking crises for 
20 emerging countries over the years 1976-2002. He showed that the nature of capital flows (in 
and out) plays a very important role on the stability of the banking sector of a country. He also 
found that an increase in foreign direct investment in a country tends to decrease the number and 
duration of shocks, while foreign debt liabilities have the opposite effect.  Milesi-Ferretti and 
Tille (2010) and Caballero (2010) found that long run foreign direct investments are less 
vulnerable to liquidity problems.  
Given the ambiguity of the results, we aim in this paper at investigating the consequences of 
financial liberalization (dejure and defacto) on the probability of triggering a banking crisis in 
developing countries within a Panel Logit model. Our methodology follows the previous studies, 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Choudhry and De Haan 2008, Joyce 2010, etc), but it 
differs in at least three points. First, we use more recent data which covers the period from 1984 
to 2007. Second, we include in our sample more developing countries; 58 in all4. Third, while 
available studies have used only three indicators of foreign direct investments scaled by gross 
domestic product (GDP henceforth), we use in this paper six different ratios. Therefore, the 
paper focuses on the responses of foreign direct investment, portfolio flows, and other debt flows 
to financial liberalization and it examines the interaction between these indicators and the total 
foreign direct assets and liabilities. The main finding of this paper reveals that indicators of 
financial liberalization (dejure and defacto) did not trigger banking crises in our sample.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the methodology and 
data, section three presents the empirical results and section four concludes. 
                                                          
3
 For example, after the Second World War until the 1970s. 
4
 We are interested to examine developed countries for several reasons. First, they are much exposed to external 
shocks as the level of their real income per capita is not sufficient to withstand a banking crisis. Second, banks’ 
balance sheets of developing countries are basically based on traditional activities and therefore, there is no 
diversification of risks. Consequently, they are vulnerable to any supply side shocks.  Third,  as Schmukler (2004) 
opined, deregulation, privatization, and advances in technology made foreign direct investment (FDI) and equity 
investments in emerging markets more attractive to firms and households in developed countries.  
 
5 
 
 
2.  Methodology 
2.1. Data and variables  
In this study, we use a Panel of 58 developing countries for a time period from 1984-2007. The 
econometric estimation is based on Panel Logit regression approach as the dependent variable, 
which is the probability of occurrence of bank crisis (BC), is assumed to be a binary choice 
variable.  With the use of Panel Logit regression we can see how changes in the different 
explanatory variables affect the probability of a bank crisis. Furthermore, the Logit model will 
help us in interpreting the regression coefficients more closely to the changes in the probability 
of bank crisis. 
For data on bank crises episodes, it was drawn from the surveys of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) 
Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) which was recently updated by Caprio et al. (2005) and 
Laeven and Valencia (2008).  The set of explanatory variables will be the same as Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache’s (2003 and 2005) and they are categorized as follows: 
 
BC = f (BV, MV, FLV) 
 
BC is the dependent variable that reflects the probability of occurrence of a Bank crisis. It takes a 
value of 1 if a country experienced a crisis and zero for otherwise. BC is a function of three 
vectors: the first vector includes banking variables (BV); the second includes macroeconomic 
variables (MV) while the last vector includes indicators of financial liberalization (FLV). These 
variables were collected from the CD-ROM of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
BV is a vector of 3 variables that reflects some characteristics of a country’s banking sector. 
These variables are the ratio of broad money to the foreign exchange reserves of the central bank 
(M2/RES), which captures the vulnerability of the economy to sudden capital outflows triggered 
by a run on the currency (Büyükkarabacak and Valev 2008). Greater M2 to reserves ratio is 
expected to raise the likelihood of banking crises. We use the ratio of bank credit to the private 
sector scaled by GDP (CPS/GDP) which is an indicator of financial development of a country. 
We also use the growth of bank credit to the private sector (GC) which reflects the dynamic and 
evolution of lending activities in a country. 
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MV is a set of macroeconomic variables which includes real gross domestic product per capita 
(GDPpc) which has been negatively linked to banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
1997). We include the rate of real GDP growth (GDPGR) which captures macroeconomic 
developments that affect the quality of bank assets.  This ratio is expected to minimize the effects 
of financial crises. We will use Inflation rate (Inf.) which is measured by percentage change in 
the consumer price index. Finally, there would be a variable to measure the degree of openness 
of the economy. This variable is defined as export plus import scaled by GDP (Op.). The 
intuition for including this variable is straightforward. 
Regarding variables of financial liberalization (FL), they are divided in 2 categories: de jure and 
de facto. The defacto measure is extracted from the database of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), 
updated in 2009. According to these authors, international financial integration (IFI) is measured 
by an index constructed through a dataset for the stocks of gross foreign assets and liabilities for 
145 nations during the period of 1970-2004. It is as follows:  
 
 
Where  the stock of gross foreign direct assets and  is the gross stock of foreign 
direct investment liabilities. Following Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), Choudhry and 
De Haan 2008, Joyce 2010, among others, we use foreign assets and foreign liabilities scaled by 
nominal GDP, noted Foreign Assets/GDP and Foreign Liabilities/GDP respectively. However, 
unlike Bonfiglioli (2008) and Joyce (20011), we use the components of Foreign Liabilities (FL) 
scaled by the total assets and total liabilities to get better understanding of the weight of each 
component in each country. Therefore, while these authors have used three indicators; in this 
paper we will use six which are: foreign direct investment, Debt and Foreign portfolio liabilities 
scaled by total assets and total liabilities each.  
 
The Dejure index is the second indicator of financial liberalization. It is an index constructed by 
Chinn and Ito (2007) which includes four variables: variable indicating the presence of multiple 
exchange rates, variable indicating restrictions on current account transactions; variable 
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indicating restrictions on capital account transactions; and variable indicating the requirement of 
the surrender of export proceeds. 
All the variables of the model are lagged one year before the date of defacto financial 
liberalization to test the effect of the level of capital flows on the probability of occurrence of a 
banking crisis.  
 
 
 
2.2. The Model  
We specify a conditional Logit Panel model with individual specific effects where the dependent 
variable, BC = 1 if crisis occurs and 0 otherwise. The aim of this method is to identify the factors 
that determine the occurrence of a bank crisis by developing countries. The model is expressed 
as follows: 
 
yit,* is a  linear function that depends on a vector of explanatory variables.  
   
With  +  is an error term that contains country and time specific fixed effects: 
Where, the  are assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean zero and 
variance σ2 
: Vector of all the explanatory variables (banking and macroeconomics) 
 : Variables of Financial liberalization.  
Consequently, the probability that a country i experiences a banking crisis in the year t is as 
follows:  
 
Where F is the partition function. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Determinants of banking crises 
Table 1 reports the estimation’s results of the determinants of banking crises and the role of 
financial globalization on the triggering of these crises. As one can see, there are three different 
equations. In equation 1 we include the control variables commonly used in the empirical 
literature dealing with the issue of banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998), 
Choudhry and De Haan 2008, Bonfiglioli (2008), Joyce (2011)). As we mentioned above, 
selected control variables are lagged for one period. 
Tableau1: Determinants of banking crisis  
 
1 2 3 
VARIABLES BC BC BC  
GDPGR(t-1) 
 
     -0.106*** 
 -0.0216 
    -0.107*** 
-0.0226 
-0.107*** 
-0.0226 
GDPpc(t-1) 
 
  -0.0623 
 
0.161 
  -0.0267 
0.155 
-0.0227 
0.166 
M2/Reserves(t-1) 
 
  -0.0016 
    -0.00167 
    0.0246*** 
-0.00813 
0.0245*** 
-0.00817 
Inflation(t-1) 
 
   0.195** 
 -0.0942 
   0.231** 
-0.0963 
0.230** 
-0.0971 
CPS/GDP(t-1) 
 
      0.0187*** 
 -0.00576 
    0.0215*** 
-0.00588 
0.0215*** 
-0.00587 
CG.(t-1) 
 
    0.173*** 
-0.0658 
  0.195** 
-0.0805 
0.196** 
-0.0805 
Op.(t-1) 
 
- 
 
- 
 
 
- 
 
- 
  -0.00821* 
-0.00447 
-0.00813* 
-0.00462 
defacto(t-1) -0.0691 
-0.125 
  
 - 
        Liabilities/GDP(t-1) -  
  
-  
-0.0644 
-0.142 
        Assets/GDP(t-1) -0.104 
-0.527 
Constant 
 
 -2.561** 
        -1.08 
-2.430** 
        -1.096 
   -2.455** 
-1.153 
Observations 
Number of Id 
Log Lik 
Pseudo R2 
1,000 
58 
-333.5 
0,430 
979 
58 
-321.1 
0,451 
979 
58 
-321.1 
0,451 
***, ** and * indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively 
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The coefficient of economic growth, proxied by GDP growth (GDPGR), is negative and 
significant at 1% level of significance. This shows that banking crises get triggered when the 
economic performance of a country is weak. More rapid economic growth is associated with 
increasing incomes and a low probability of a banking crisis. 
The coefficient of inflation is positive and significant at a 5% level of significance. This indicates 
that a banking crisis is likely to occur in countries with a high inflation rate. The variable 
M2/reserves is negative but not significant while the domestic credit growth (CG) and private 
sector credit to GDP (CPS/GDP) are both positive and significant at the 1% level. This confirms 
the effect of rapid domestic credit growth on the probability of occurrence of banking crises. 
Despite the huge finance and growth literature showing the positive relationship between greater 
credit levels and economic growth, it appears that rapid growth in bank credit to the private 
sector is associated with banking crises in developing countries. Our finding joint the previous 
studies (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache 1997, Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart 1998, and 
Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999) and follows the IMF’ (2004) estimates which found that about 75 
percent of credit booms in emerging markets end in banking crises.  
In equation 2, we added two variables that reflect the liberalization process.  The first variable is 
openness (OP.) and the second one is defacto liberalization and both are lagged of one year. The 
results of the model are similar to the previous one but M2/reserves becomes positive and 
significant at 1% level of significance. This shows that, following the liberalization process, 
when the financial sector holds considerable foreign currency liabilities it becomes more exposed 
to a banking and financial crisis.  
The coefficient of openness (Op.) is negative and significant at 10% level of significance. This 
indicates that openness to external financial systems could facilitate the transmission of crises 
and confirms the effect of macroeconomic shocks on the probability of occurrence of banking 
crises.  Regarding defacto liberalization, it has a negative sign but is not significant.  
Turing now to the third equation; we replaced defacto liberalization by its two components 
which are foreign assets to GDP and foreign liabilities to GDP.  Despite this disaggregation, the 
result is identical to the model 2.  
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3.2. Defacto and Dejure liberalization and banking crisis  
We use a new method to estimate how foreign direct investment could generate a banking crisis. 
While Joyce (2011) and other previous studies have used three5 components of foreign direct 
liabilities scaled by the country’s GDP, we will use in this paper’s six lagged indicators namely: 
Debt/Total Assets, Foreign Direct Investment/Total Assets, Foreign Portfolio Equity 
Liabilities/Total Assets, Debt/Total Liabilities, Foreign Direct investment Liabilities/Total 
Liabilities and Foreign Portfolio Equity Liabilities /Total Liabilities. The aim of this 
disaggregation is to measure the weight of each component in the total foreign direct investment 
and to give a better understanding of which ratio is the most likely to trigger a banking crisis.  
3.2.1. Defacto liberalization and banking crisis   
In the section above we followed the previous empirical studies and we proxied defacto 
liberalization by an index of international financial integration (IFI). Empirical results show that 
deafcto liberalization does not have any considerable role in triggering financial and banking 
crisis. By divided defacto into Liabilities/GDP and Assets/GDP ratios, we also found similar 
results. In this section we disaggregate these two measures by type of capital flows. Therefore, 
we will use the six ratios as explained above. The results are displayed in the table below. 
                                                          
5
 Foreign direct investment (FDIL/GDP), foreign portfolio equity liabilities (FPEL/GDP) and foreign debt 
investments (FDL/GDP).  
11 
 
 
 
Table 2. Banking crises and Defacto liberalization 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
VARIABLES BC BC BC BC BC BC 
GDPGR (t-1) 
-
0.0994*** -0.141*** -0.201*** 
-
0.0986*** -0.100*** -0.195*** 
-0.0217 -0.0275 -0.0407 -0.0216 -0.0216 -0.0405 
GDP.pc (t-1) -0.0112 -0.0987 0.259 0.111 0.108 0.34 
-0.158 -0.183 -0.287 -0.162 -0.16 -0.286 
M2/Reserves 0.0209** 0.0221** 0.0479** 0.0213*** 0.0211** 0.0284** 
(t-1) -0.00875 -0.00883 -0.0204 -0.00822 -0.0082 -0.0144 
Inf. (t-1) 0.222** 0.174 0.124 0.173* 0.162* 0.317** 
-0.0972 -0.111 -0.158 -0.0979 -0.098 -0.155 
CPS/GDP(t-1) 0.0234*** 0.0237*** 0.0248*** 0.0225*** 0.0215*** 0.0390*** 
-0.00616 -0.00668 -0.00807 -0.00589 -0.00588 -0.0107 
CG. (t-1) 0.196** 0.339 0.636 0.200** 0.201** 0.155 
-0.0803 -0.268 -0.499 -0.0849 -0.0856 -0.224 
Op. (t-1) 
-
0.00921** -0.008 -0.00961 -0.00735* -0.00688 -0.0121* 
-0.0043 -0.00495 -0.00606 -0.00422 -0.00424 -0.00703 
Debt/Tot.A(t-1)  0.905           
 
-0.748 
FDIL/Tot. A (t-1)   
 
1.662 
 
-1.498 
FPEL/Tot.A (t-1)   -7.94 
-8.971 
Debt/Tot.L(t-1)    2.103** 
-0.947 
FDIL/Tot.L(-1)    -2.713** 
-1.08 
FPEL/Tot.L (t-1)   2.176 
-3.629 
Constant -3.127*** -1.966 -4.484** -5.031*** -2.800*** -6.082*** 
  -1.166 -1.259 -2.145 -1.523 -1.051 -2.129 
Observations 979 779 528 979 979 625 
Number of Id 58 51 41 58 58 54 
Log Lik -320.5 -260.7 -144.9 -318.6 -317.7 -157.2 
Pseudo R2 0,452 0,554 0,752 0,455 0,457 0,731 
***, ** and * indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively 
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As we have six indicators, we will separately introduce each ratio along with the set of 
explanatory variables. Unlike Joyce (2011), we keep the openness variable (OP) as it was 
significant and positive in the equation 2 and 3 of table 1.  
In the first equation, we introduced the debt to total foreign assets ratio (debt/Tot.A) and we 
found that it does not trigger a banking crisis in developing countries. We also found that the 
results of the explanatory variables remained unchanged except for M2/Reserves which became 
positive and significant at 5% level of significance. Again, this shows the problem of holding 
large foreign currency liabilities. This scenario is the main reason behind the Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 in which the currency depreciation ravaged the financial sector of the so called 
“Tigers countries”. In equation 2 when we added foreign direct investment liabilities to total 
assets (FDIL/Tot. A.), we also found that this ratio does not trigger a crisis. However, inflation, 
credit growth and openness have become non-significant. Similar results were found while 
introducing foreign portfolio equity liabilities ratio (FPEL/Tot.A). In equation 4 when 
introducing debt to total foreign liabilities ratio we found that it could trigger a financial crisis 
and all the explanatory variables, except GDP per capita, are significant. This shows that crises 
could happen in countries with a large debt ratio. The recent experience of PIIGS6 countries and 
Cyprus are the best witness of problem related to high debt. Similar results were found in 
equation 5 with foreign direct investment liabilities to total foreign liabilities ratio but openness 
becomes insignificant. Finally, in equation 6, foreign portfolio equity liabilities to total liabilities 
ratio is positive but not significant which mean that it could not engender a crisis in these 
developing countries.  
3.2.2.  Dejure liberalization and banking crisis   
 
In this section, we aim at measuring whether or not dejure liberalization triggers banking crises 
in the developing countries. To this end, we use only the dejure indicator and we introduce the 
different variables which are in liaison with the dejure liberalization. The results are displayed in 
the table 3.  
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 Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain.  
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Table 3 : Banking crises and Dejure liberalization 
1 2 3 4 
VARIABLES BC BC BC BC 
GDPGR (t-1)  -0.123*** (0.0237) 
-0.130*** 
(0.0257) 
-0.133*** 
(0.0262) 
-0.126*** 
(0.0266) 
GDP.pc (t-1) -0.0866 (0.171) 
-0.123 
(0.179) 
-0.136 
(0.180) 
-0.125 
(0.178) 
M2/Reserves (t-1) 
  
0.0256*** 
(0.00861) 
0.0259*** 
(0.00860) 
0.0265*** 
(0.00858) 
0.0240*** 
(0.00842) 
Inf. (t-1) 
  
0.292*** 
(0.110) 
0.295*** 
(0.110) 
0.319*** 
(0.114) 
0.263** 
(0.110) 
CPS/GDP(t-1)  0.0254*** (0.00655) 
0.0250*** 
(0.00655) 
0.0262*** 
(0.00662) 
0.0265*** 
(0.00654) 
CG.(t-1)  0.210** (0.0914) 
0.210** 
(0.0907) 
0.222** 
(0.0949) 
0.313** 
(0.135) 
Op.(t-1) 
  
-0.00886* 
(0.00465) 
-0.00773 
(0.00489) 
-0.00984* 
(0.00505) 
-0.00856* 
(0.00482) 
L.F.dejure (t-1) 
  
-0.113 
(0.109) 
-0.0996 
(0.110) 
-0.0285 
(0.110) 
-0.0590 
(0.109) 
Liabilities/GDP(t-1)    
  
  
  
 
  
-0.107 
(0.157) 
-0.164 
(0.162) 
-0.420 
(0.264) 
Size 
  
  
  
  
0.0417 
(0.0304) 
  
  
Public debt/GDP  (t-1) 0.00693* (0.00413) 
Constant -2.350** -2.030 -2.411* -2.157* 
  (1.165) (1.245) (1.300) (1.266) 
Observations 954 954 931 925 
Number of Id 58 58 57 58 
Log Lik -302.7 -302.5 -288.0 -292.0 
Pseudo R2 0,482 0,483 0,507 0,501 
***, ** and * indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively 
In the first equation, the dejure variable is negative and not significant. This shows that it does 
not trigger banking crises in the developing countries of our sample. On the other hand, all the 
explanatory variables, except GDP per capita, are significant. 
In the second equation, we introduced foreign liabilities to GDP ratio but the results remained 
unchanged and dejure does not produce a crisis. Again, when introducing the size of the 
government, measured by the government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP, we 
do not find any change.  Finally, in the last equation, we added the public debt of the country as a 
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share of GDP. It is well known that larger government budget deficits are expected to increase 
the probability of crises. In the estimation, we find that the public debt ratio is positive and 
significant a 10% level of significance and the signs of the other explanatory variables remain 
unchanged. It appears that when the budget deficit increases, developing countries are incapable 
to support the high costs of insolvent banks. Moreover, governments facing severe fiscal 
imbalances are more likely to use the financial sector as an off-budget source of funding for 
government objectives, by pressuring banks to direct loans to favored borrowers. According to 
Keefer (2001), since securing repayment of loan obligations from these borrowers is typically a 
difficult proposition for banks, these pressures can translate into solvency difficulties for the 
financial system. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
The aim of this paper is to examine the consequences of financial liberalization on the economic 
and financial stability of developing countries. Precisely, we tried to understand whether the 
adoption of financial liberalization is followed by banking crises or not.  Our sample covers a 
panel of 58 countries observed during the period 1984-2007. The empirical analysis is based on 
Panel Logit model. Empirical results show that dejure liberalization does not trigger a baking 
crisis in our sample. Regarding deafcto liberalization, results also show that it does not have any 
considerable role in triggering financial and banking crises. By divided defacto into 
Liabilities/GDP and Assets/GDP ratios, we also found similar results. However, the 
disaggregation of these two measures by type of capital flows, empirical results show that 
foreign debt liabilities to total liabilities and foreign direct investment liabilities to total liabilities 
generate banking crises in these countries. Therefore, these are the real factors of banking crises 
in developing countries in relation with financial liberalization.  
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Annex 
3.1. Statistics table 
Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
BC 1536 .1295573 .3359251 0 1 
GDP 1445 3.421713 6.847834 -51.03086 106.2798 
GDPpc 1457 6.835229 1.074326 4.056728 9.147261 
M2/Reserves 1372 39.16153 370.6495 .000116 7427.439 
Inflation  1237 2.495222 1.522796 -3.296556 10.10283 
Credit/GDP 1344 29.27446 27.04324 .6827951 165.7191 
Credit Growth. 1272 1.551145 34.1434 -9.863692 1201.817 
Openness 1407 69.45314 37.30908 12.34638 280.361 
Dejure   1404 -.2339293 1.414839 -1.85564 2.45573 
Defacto  1426 1.582131 2.166722 .1660583 31.25265 
Liabilities/GDP(t-1) 1426 1.251492 2.08078 .0495588 30.95495 
Assets/GDP(t-1) 1425 .3308708 .3496893 .0162082 4.653005 
FDAL/ Tot.Liabilities 1425 .225361 .1633689 .0004923 .9251236 
FDAL/Tot.Assets. 1077 .0755085 .096875 .0000193 .6109056 
Debt/ Tot.Liabilities 1426 .7502077 .1842804 .0680942 1 
Debt/Tot.Assets. 1425 .5630739 .2029139 .0797269 .9959071 
FREL/ Tot.Liabilities 1426 .0244106 .0558812 0 .462468 
FPEL/Tot.Assets 1425 .0131464 .033851 0 .3938915 
Table 1 : List of countries  
Algeria Guinea Panama 
Argentina Guinea-Bissau Peru 
Armenia Guyana Philippines 
Azerbaijan Haiti Romania 
Bangladesh Indonesia Russian Federation 
Belarus Jamaica Senegal 
Bolivia Jordan Sri Lanka 
Brazil Kenya Tanzania 
Bulgaria Latvia Thailand 
Burkina Faso Liberia Togo 
Cameroon Lithuania Tunisia 
China Madagascar Turkey 
Colombia Malaysia Uganda 
Congo. Dem. Rep. Mali Ukraine 
Congo. Rep. Mexico Venezuela. RB 
Dominican Republic Morocco Vietnam 
Ecuador Mozambique Yemen. Rep. 
Egypt. Arab Rep. Nicaragua Zambia 
El Salvador Niger   
Ghana Nigeria 
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